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VASILIS KOKKOTAS - KATERINA PLAKITSI
TIME FOR EDUCATION: ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
DISCURSIVENESS IN TEACHING FUNDAMENTAL 
SCIENTIFIC TOPICS
SUMMARY
Science has the character of construction of explicative normative 
models, whose semantic value is assessed instrumentally, though the 
quantified corroboration of predictions, or their compliance with the 
facts, constituting a separate world. But we oppose to its approach as 
a "logis tic” activity, depraved of any ontological substantiation, since, 
this would ignore the meditative or interpretive features salient in it. 
The ontological appropriation of the world is a multidisciplinary task, 
which cannot be integrated without a form that combines argumenta­
tion with a meaningful discourse, open to culture.
The view of learning science as culture acquisition affords an intui­
tive, holistic, and rich appreciation of students' experiences in a science 
classroom. Common cultural mediators in science education are narra­
tives. McClosky and Bruner have been long-time advocates of the 
use of narrative in education. As a case study, we applied a both cu­
ltural and ontological approach to the teaching of time in primary 
education.
Key words: ontology, epistemology, discursiveness, and science 
education.
Introduction.
We formulate, as an outline, our position, by stating that educa­
tion cannot approach science and culture as "accomplished”, "fini­
shed” products of the past, but must view them as processes in conti­
nuous evolution. This process as we know since Piaget, cannot ignore
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the condition and the preconceptions of the learning subject, which 
have not a continuous smooth character, but involve in a conflictive 
form aesthetic, social and cultural elements, which cannot be exclu­
ded from the paedeutic practice. According to our opinion, education 
is interpretive both from the aspect of science but also from the point 
of view of the learning subject.We agree with J. Piaget’s position that 
"the child must be considered, not as a purely imitative being, but 
as an organism who assimilates the things. .. according to his proper 
structure”. (Piaget, 2003, p. 30). Based on this ground we believe that 
a child, during its development, generates interpretive skills, which 
are developed in individual and intersubjective codes of deciphering 
messages, which viewed in the perspective of future, surely do not 
exhaust the interpretive practice merely in the comportment of na­
ming. On the other hand, we share the point of view that science, in 
case it is not crippled, is not exhausted in a quantified rendering of 
sense data, but ondulâtes between plienomenalistic subjevctivism and 
ontological objectivity, aspects that are transcended if it is approached 
under the historical - cultural perspective.
1. Ontology, subjectivity and knowledge.
Surely knowledge, especially science, has the character of con­
struction of explicative normative models, whose semantic value is 
assessed instrumentally, through the quantified, statistical corrobo­
ration of predictions, or their compliance with the facts, constituting 
a separate world. But we oppose to its approach as a "logistic” acti­
vity, in the sense of logical positivism depraved of any ontological 
substantiation, since, according to our point of view this would ignore 
the meditative or interpretive features salient in it. It would be, of 
course, futile to attempt to give a rigorous logical proof of the existence 
of the external would. Since Kant we know that this would lead us to 
antinomies. But what we want to stress, is that the statements of the 
negative form about external reality, as e.g is the statement "trees do 
not exist”, hint an indirect conception of what, e.g a "tree” is. To men­
tion Merleau - Ponty, in order to demarcate the context of this indi­
rect insinuation, "to say that perception is, and has always been, an 
"inspection of the spirit”, is to define it, not through what it is giving 
to us, but through this, that among its constituents resists to the hupo- 
thesis of non existence” (Merleau - Ponty, 1964, p. 61). What we want 
to stress with the foregone citation, is that perceptive data, hint the
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positing of the ontological question. True it would be dogmatic to ne­
gate the fact that our knowledge of the world cannot be established 
on final principles. But on the other hand we state our position that 
thought is impossible without the questioning of its ontological foun­
dations and furthermore, citing once more Merleau - Ponty, the trea­
ding of the path of making "the perceptive faith to interrogate itself” 
(Merleau - Ponty op. cit. p. 138).
The above-mentioned positions do not intend to abolish the pro­
grams of the sciences of nature and society. But it must be clear that onto­
logical interrogation is necessary for the integration of scientific know­
ledge and education, and also that positivistic phenomenalism having 
as its consort the demand of a yes/no answer, is more dogmatic than 
the ontological questioning as it evolves in the history of science, 
education and culture. At this pont can be raised the question: can 
this position annihilate science through the destruction of the kno­
wing/learning subject?
An undermining of subjectivism would give emphasis to the need 
of an aesthetic enhancement of the world. On the other hand this would 
have made weaker the limits of the distinction between the interior 
and the exterior, the action and its effect. We mean by this that the 
category "distinction” is less fruitful than that of process. This dive­
rsifies our attempt for an ontological emphasis on knowledge from 
the Aristotelian "contemplative life”, which was founded on firm, 
eternal principles. As stated Vico, commenting in a pessimistic tone 
the difference between ancient and modern thought (i.e. the thought 
as proceeded from Renaissance until the Enlightenment) the ancient 
philosophers "did not trod as the physicists groping, but as the archi­
tects who would construct an immense building” (Vico in M. Fuma­
roli (ed.), 2001, p. 438).
By the foretold we do not intend to doubt about the fact that in 
knowledge are involved active subjects. But we think that it would 
be unfruitful to accept the existence of an extramundane, or even 
transcendental subject, which in turn is the foundation of an indivi­
dualistic approach to the question of identity. Since we do not intend 
at this point to explore this problem, but only the educative approach 
to it we deem the most fruitful is that of J. Bruner, according to whom 
the "self becomes "dialogiue dependent” designed as much for the 
recipient of our discourse as for intrapsychic purposes” (J. Bruner, 
1990, p. 101).We agree with the position of Piaget cited at the begin­
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ning of this paper, that the child assimilates the world according to 
"his proper structure” ; we only stress that this structure is mundane.
On the other hand Piaget’s position which is giving a ground to 
the construct! ist concept of "cognitive autonomy of the subject” is 
connected in spite of its mundane constitution, with that of the kantian 
critical rationality, which is the fruitful element of the transcendental 
philosophy. Citing P. Ricoeur, we agree with him that what makes 
sense of the transcendental subject "lies in the concept of judgment 
conceived one time as a capacity (or a faculty), and the other as a 
performance” (P. Ricoeur, 2004, p. 44). But we emphasize the fact 
that these meehanismzs have a mundane substrate, which in its psy­
chological aspects presuppose the inter-subjective interaction of the 
subject. Speaking about intersubjectivity one must have in mind, that 
the mechanisms of the recognition of things is not identical with that 
of personalities, since according to Ricoeur their recognition is an expe- 
riance "not only of confidence but also of complicity” (P. Ricoeur, 
op. cit., p. 101). Thus subjectivity presupposes, on this ground, an aspect, 
which is ontological social and cultural.
2. Discursive analysis and dialogue.
What follows from the foregone argumentation is the fact that 
the ontological appropriation of the world is a multidisciplinary task, 
which cannot be intergrated, if education wants to lead humanity to 
self-knowledge, without a form that combines argumentation with a 
meaningful discourse, open to the field of culture. By this we do not 
intend to identify science and culture; this would ignore the forma­
lized character of the first and would lead to the impoverishment of 
the emotional content of the second.
Although this demarcation is ob\dous and even commonplace we 
must admit that in the contemporary state of civilization, and espe­
cially of education, its positivistic absolutization, i.e its approach as a 
difference between sense and non sense, which views reason as the 
eradication of emotion, from the point of view of education would be 
prosaic or even dangerous. Speaking about danger we do not speak in 
utilitarian terms but in terms, of learning performance and even more 
of the capacity of contemporary civilization to attain its cognitive, 
social, and cultural target, which is the elaboration of an integrated, 
and at the same time polyphonic in its components, world view, accor­
ding to which humankind will attain self-knowledge.
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Distanced from positivism on the one hand, and relativism but 
also from "monophony” on the other, we do not intend to give to our 
approach the character of a descriptive vulgarization or a claim of 
the acquisition of a "final” truth. We beleive that this "refinement” 
of knowledge is always a process under construction, whose inception 
was the discovery of fire, writing and drawing, and has been sealed by 
such different thinkers as Plato, Montaigne and Piaget. But we also 
want to stress, together with Bruner, the emergency of an occasioning 
of an interpretive turn in the sciences of man - we mean a way of thin­
king that would be a turn to "a more interpretive approach to cogni­
tion concerned with meaning making” (J. Bruner, op. cit., p. 2), having 
always in mind to avoid an identification of meaning with naming, in 
the sense that we deem that this interpretive approach constitutes 
itself an attempt for an integrated discourse about the world, which 
consists in an autonomous form of life that potentially can create in 
its turn other forms of life.
We follow, at this point, the distinction drawn by the French lin­
guist E. Benveniste between discourse and text viz. the character of 
the articulation of written language, according to which text proceeds 
in the third, while discourse in the first person. As mentions G. Genne- 
tte, this distinction is related to that between mimesis and the medi­
tative forms of language, who transmit notional reflection. In the se­
cond case "there is no representation, no fiction, only speech that is 
invested directly on the discourse of work”. (G. Gennette: 1969, p. 62). 
But Gennette is conscious of the fact that there is almost always a 
certain portion of narration in the discourse, and a certain portion of 
discourse in the narration (G. Gennett: op. cit., p. 65). Furthermore 
J. Kristeva hints that, although in an insinuated form, narrative has 
always an indirect dialogical, plotted form: "The dialogical play, as a 
correlation of signs, the dialogical permutation of two signifiers for a 
signified, is performed at the plan of narrative, without being exterio­
rized in the textual manifestation, as does in the case of a novel” (J. 
Kristeva 1969, p. 98).
The previous statement hints that the accomplished narrative is 
the outcome of the interaction between discourse and text, but also 
that in these two forms of writing exists a latent dialogical, or even 
fictive element. Of course a conceptual exposition cannot be directly 
"polyphonic”, in Bakhtine’s sense, but one has to acknowledge the 
fact that it cannot be the subject of an interpretation of the yes/no 
form, and we asses as fruitful the opinion of Kristeva, about the exi­
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 03:19:28 |
54 Vasilis Kokkotas - Katetina Plakitsi
stence of a laternt dialogical - fictive element in it. This opinion can 
be traced back to Plato, and we state emphatically the following frag­
ment from Plato’s ''Sophist”: "Foreigner: So, intellect and discourse 
are identical; but the internal dialogue inside the soul, implemented 
without voice was not dubbed intellect? —Theaetetus: Of course yes. 
(Plato, Sophist 263e).
In the case of writing a dissertation, or a text for educative purpo­
ses, one must always have in mind that this form of writing "must 
have a movement, and this term is preferable to that of plan” (G. 
Gennette: op. cit. p. 35). This is one more indication of the dialectical 
character of the discourse. In brief, we state that because of this, its 
meaning cannot be "purely” conceptual in a strictly univocal sense. 
By this we mean that this meaning is in its turn one, at the same time 
discursive /dialogical narrative, and the process of signifying, which of 
course is a thematical and normative process, which follows the path 
of an open historically determined course.
3. Science in a Multiscience Perspective.
What is science when we refer to science education? This question 
may be curious for conventional science educators, because for them 
science is science. Ogawa (1995) adopts a rather broader definition of 
science; that is, 'a rational perceiving of reality’ where 'perceiving’ 
means both 'the action constructing reality and construct of reality’ 
(p. 588). Caution should be taken that the 'rationality’ in this context 
never means Western modern rationality alone. If 'rational’ is the co­
rrect term for behavior in accordance with rules, there can be a kind 
of rationality in each culture. Then he distihnguishes three types of 
'science’.
The first type, 'indigenous science’ is defined as 'a culture-depen­
dent collective rational perceiving of reality’, where 'collective’ means 
held in sufficiently similar form by many persons to allow effective 
communication, but independent of any particular mind or set of minds 
(p. 588). It is the science in a certain culture. A specific cultural group, 
not a specific individual, holds indigenous science.
The second type, 'personal science’ is the science at the personal 
level and defined as 'a rational perceiving of reality, which is unique 
to each individual’ (p. 588).
The last type of science is Western modern science, which is de­
fined as 'a collective rational perceiving of reality, which is shared and
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authorized by the scientific community’ (p. 589). Only the scientific 
community itself justifies western modern science. All other institutions 
have been excluded from the 'inquisition’ of scientific justification, 
and are expected to accept it without objections or doubts. While the 
former two types of science pertain to the every-day-life world, chara­
cterized by a human vitality and purpose found in the descriptions 
and explanations of what scientists called natural phenomena,Western 
modern science pertains to a Cartesian materialistic world in which 
humans are seen in reductionistic and mechanistic terms (p. 589).While 
indigenous science and personal science treat the everyday-life world, 
Western modern science treats the scientists’ theoretical world. Thus, 
we science educators are just in the multiscience setting.
4. The need of integration.
Glen Aikenhead’s perspective on how students make sense of their 
natural world widens even further if we consider the worldviews that 
students possess. Cobern (1991, 1993, 1994b) draws upon anthropo­
logy to hone a model of worldview comprised of seven "logico-structu- 
ral categories” (self, other, causality, classification, relationship, time, 
and space). Worldview "provides a special plausibility structure of 
ideas, activities, and values, that allows one to gauge the plausibility 
of any assertion” (1993, p. 57). Worldviews are culturally validated 
presuppositions about the natural world. To understand a student’s 
worldview is to anticipate what meanings in a science curriculum 
will appear plausible and which will not. Seen as a "fundamental orga­
nization of the mind” (Cobern, 1991, p. 42), worldview connects with 
cognitive psychology and lends itself to fruitful investigations into 
various worldviews, including those of Western science. However, as 
a culturally dependent fundamental organization of the mind, world­
view suggests a broader perspective on science education: learning 
science as culture acquisition.
The view of learning science as culture acquisition affords an intui­
tive, holistic, and rich appreciation of students’ experiences in a science 
classroom (Costa, 1995; Hawkins and Pea, 1987; Maddock, 1981; 
Swift, 1992; Wolcott, 1991). It is a practical extension of constructi­
vist theories and plausibility structures. Driver’s social constructivism 
has also moved towards a perspective of culture acquisition: "Lea­
rning science in the classroom involves children entering a new commu­
nity of discourse, a new culture” (Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer and
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Scott, 1994; p. 11). Research into personal, social, and worldview con­
structivism will continue to contribute significantly to the broadened 
conception of learning science as culture acquisition; for example, re­
spectively, the work of Driver, Leach, Scott andWood Robinson (1994), 
Solomon, Duveen and Scott (1994), and Lawrenz and Gray (1995).
The cultural perspective proposed in this paper recognizes conven­
tional science teaching as an attempt at transmitting a scientific subcu­
lture to students (Hawkins and Pea, 1987). But cultural transmission 
can either be supportive or disruptive (Baker and Taylor, 1995; Batti- 
ste, 1986; Urevbu, 1987). If the subculture of science generally harmo­
nizes with a student’s life-world culture, science instruction will tend 
to support the student’s view of the world ("enculturation”). On the 
other hand, if the subculture of science is generally at odds with a 
student’s life-world culture, science instruction will tend to disrupt the 
student’s view of the world by trying to replace it or marginalize it 
("assimilation”). The distinction between the enculturation and assi­
milation forms of cultural transmission is central to the cultural perspe­
ctive that we are proposing for science education. Enculturation appeals 
to students who are science enthusiasts while assimilation attempts 
to dominate the thinking of students. Both enculturation and assimi­
lation require cultural border crossings into the subculture of science 
(Aikenhead, 1996).
5. Narratives as alternative media to teach science.
A common cultural setting in science education is the use of 
narrative stories. McCloskey (1990) suggests that there are two dominant 
ways by which people come to understand a topic - by metaphor or 
narrative (or models and histories) and that different fields tend to be 
dominated by one mode, for instance metaphors dominate physics 
whilst narrative dominates biology. Whilst this may be true for certain 
domains, there are other fields where both metaphor and narrative 
play important roles, for instance in engineering education, where both 
mathematical models and case studies are used to good effect by 
educators. It is also debatable to what extent a metaphor can be viewed 
as a narrative structured in a specific manner. Bruner (1996) has been 
a long-time advocate of the use of narrative in education, particularly 
science education. He has proposed three primitive forms of 'meaning­
making’, which involve an individual’s spontaneous inclination to
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engage in a dialogue with material, to impose some form of organi­
sation upon it and to make comparisons with an individual sense of 
the conventional. He suggests that narrative meets the needs of these
three modes well:
"Stories are the vehicles par excellence for entrenching the first 
three modes of meaning-making into a more structured whole”.
Narrative has a broader significance than education. It has been 
shown that experts in any field tend to embody their knowledge in the 
form of narrative. It can be argued then that to become knowledgeable 
in a domain is to become familiar with its narratives, and to construct 
your own relevant ones.
Narratives also have an important cultural significance. Whyte 
(1981) states the study of narrative involves: "reflection on the very 
nature of culture and possibly even on the nature of humanity itself”.
Others have suggested that narrative is a means by which we 
interpret out notion of self, for instance Brooks (1985) claims: "Our 
lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with the stories that 
we tell, all of which are reworked in that story of our own lives that 
we narrate to ourselves. . .”.
Similarly Fisher (1987) has proposed a 'narrative paradigm’ whe­
rein he suggests that stories are the method by which people impose 
order and reason upon the world. By framing events in a story it per­
mits individuals to interpret their environment, and importantly it 
provides a framework for making decisions about actions and their 
likely outcomes. Individuals create new stories for themselves which 
"better account for their lives”.
The challenge to science communication is to establish a bridge 
between science and the general public. To this end it is necessary to 
translate science into some common language that allows the reader 
to become interested and excited about scientific information.
If we are to educate society in and about science, we have to treat 
equally all of the cultural media of science. We have to consider, in 
particular, science fiction, science fantasy, drama, and other forms of 
narratives that include science as a theme, which are cultural expressions 
of the history of science in our society-receptacles of scientific know­
ledge and important resources for science communication. In a broader 
sense, those narratives represent an imposrtant means for science com­
munication to transmit and recreate information in an accurate, memo­
rable and enjoyable wrny.
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6. A case study: Teaching the concept of time.
In order to expand science education to the horizon of culture we 
have to reconsider our teaching approaches to the fundamental topics, 
as it is the topic of time.
In the case of time, as one of the fundamental categories of thought 
(Piaget 1969, Ogborn & Mariani 1995), we carried out a researching 
program for three years in Athens. The research question was: how 
could we help pupils to reconcile their own; subjective; and relativi­
stic; perceptions about time to the typical; conventional; objective; 
and homogenous; time of the society.
In the first phase of our program, we recorded pupils’ conceptions 
of time, following the Piagetian method of clinical interview. Accor­
ding to the Piagetian perspective, the four categories of thought - object, 
space time and causality - have those constructing mechanisms that 
will be uselful in constructing relevant concepts, providing cognitive 
economy. Furthermore, concepts, such as historical time, longitude, 
growth, and measurement of time, requirr re-combination to give unity 
or to make a whole. For this, we try to show the inter-relationships 
explicitly among the above concepts by being able to cross-refer to 
relevant fields where appropriate.
At the second phase of our program we expanded our study to the 
social constructivist field; and we tried to help pupils to make a cogni­
tive progress in small steps; or according to Vygotsky to scaffolding 
their ideas about time; that is to say to enrich pupils’ conceptualiza­
tion of time.
We designed a research program to study a curriculum including 
teaching strategies adapted to childern of 9-10 years of age. Children 
performed tasks related to different disciplines, (History, Science, Te- 
chonology etc.). Simultaneously, we anticipated children to develop 
cognitive skills, such as observation, comparison, classification, corre­
lation, communication etc. The procedure followed the steps of action 
research.We gave a query to the children of four classrooms to find out 
their ideas about time. Then we teach the topic of time, interdiscipli­
nary, for two months, using 20 worksheets. During teaching, both 
teachers and external observers were keeping records concerning the 
cooperative process and the development of skills.We also made video 
and audio records. After teaching, we gave to children a similar query 
and another one three months later. By elaboration of the data we 
reconstructed the curriculum to be more effective.
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At the third phase we created open learning envrironments (Roth, 
1995), and we used learning strategies, such as dialogues (Lemke, 1990), 
argumentation (Toulmin, 1958, Walton, 1996), academic controversies 
(Johnson & Johnson, 1995) etc. Pupils exchange their ideas, they were 
telling stories about time, and they argued using many types of justi­
fications. They challenged each other; but also they negotiate their 
ideas and make a synthesis that made meaning to them.
The first outcomes of this project show off the necessity of inte­
gration through interdisciplinarity, about fundamental topics such as 
time. Besides, children develop skills (they estimate and measure du­
rations more successfully; they make right successions of events or 
actions, even they do not observe them directly; they can correlate 
dimensions such as length and time). Furthermore, they expanded their 
perception about linear and cyclic time, through cooperative learning; 
arguing; and also challenging each other. They also improve attitudes 
about their sociocognitive roles in their group. Pupils conceptualize 
time in two dynamic/interactive ways: one subjective (psychological 
time) and one objective (social time that reflects the time of the clas­
sical /Newtonian Physics).
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